This proposal seeks to enhance the emissions committee’s toolkit while reducing the lower emissions bound to enable greater flexibility for future operations and adaptability to evolving circumstances.
If this proposal proceeds to a vote, the primary changes will include the following:
Reduce the lower emissions bounds by 50%.
Empower the Emissions Committee to adjust the MIN-ADA DAO owned POL pool depth by up to 10% of the current depth on a biweekly basis, ensuring healthier slippage and minimized price impact.
Authorize the Emissions Committee to allocate withdrawn liquidity to the MIN-ADA liquidity operations wallet, the treasury, or an idle wallet (as outlined in an upcoming utility integration proposal) for storage or reassignment of the assets.
Approve additional compensation for the committee’s increased responsibilities associated with monitoring liquidity pools and emissions adjustments.
Approve compensation for the work involved in drafting and implementing this proposal.
Should this proposal be put forth for an on-chain vote?
Item 3 is way too vague for me. There’s a LOT of m0ney tied up in MIN/ADA POL. I can’t support giving the authority to draw that down 10% every 2 weeks without extremely tight restrictions on what exactly can be done with those funds after they removed from the liquidity pool.
Max bound is 10% and it is stated that this doesn’t warrant a use of the full 10%, but gives us the ability to act if needed. And it is stated that this would either be sent to the liquidity wallet, to treasury, or an idle wallet in item 3 itself as well as in the proposal.
We must adapt and cannot afford to remain stagnant. At present, I see no alternative proposal that addresses this issue in a structured and methodical manner.
Request for Lower Bound Adjustment: We are approaching the DAO to propose a decrease in the lower bound, and we have painstakingly detailed the rationale behind this decision. This request is well within the scope of our mandate as we are simply seeking permissions from the DAO for a new proposal.
POL Management: The Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) remains under the DAO’s control. Specifically, this pertains only to the MIN/ADA POL, which is currently the least efficient within the ecosystem. If the DAO cannot trust a group of individuals—elected by its members and who have consistently delivered results—to manage this under strict parameters, I respect that perspective. However, I believe our track record speaks to our capability to execute this responsibly.
Data-Driven Decisions: Our approach to emissions allocation has always been data-driven. This proposal is no different. Unless there is a better solution offered, criticism without constructive feedback adds limited value. Countless factors are considered in these decisions; they are not arbitrary. Moreover, the council comprises five members with diverse and often conflicting viewpoints, ensuring a balanced and well-thought-out outcome.
Compensation for Effort: I firmly believe that no committee member, including myself, should be expected to work on this initiative without compensation. If I am unable to be compensated for the time and effort I invest in improving Minswap, I will have no choice but to redirect my energy elsewhere and I would expect most committee members to do the same. Time is valuable, and every council member is highly committed and busy.
While criticism is easy to offer, developing a solution that satisfies all stakeholders is far more challenging. I have done my best to present this proposal with data and transparency, explaining the reasoning behind every aspect. If this is insufficient, I sincerely apologize for any shortcomings. I welcome any alternative proposals supported by data that can provide a viable solution.
after reading the proposal, this seems to provide a similar function as that provided by the federal reserve in managing money supply, albeit in a much smaller impact zone.
The production of action and rationale notes provides necessary transparency, thank you for that. In a final proposal, it would be good to have some form of feedback governance that preserves the value and accuracy of those notes.
