Incentivize Governance Participation of Min-Stakers

Proposals
1

$Min is the governance token of Minswap. However, there is very little, if any, incentive for $Min holders to participate in governance except when a topic might be pertinent to them. Furthermore, any incentive to participate is undermined by the freely distributed protocol revenue via the fee switch for staking. They can set it and forget it, making quorum increasingly difficult to achieve. This causes an inequity between enthusiastic minnow holders and indifferent whales who don’t participate or contribute but nevertheless stake and dilute the rewards of those who give their energy and time. This is not a proposal for one man - one vote, however, but rather for all stake-holders to be involved in the goings on of Minswap, to put their mouth where their money is.

The proposal is that all rewards for staking $Min (Ada, Min and any IDO tokens etc) be given only to wallets that have recorded recent participation in governance via an on-chain vote.

I am specifically looking to Indigo Protocol as a model.

Do you agree, in principle? Details can be developed in the corresponding Temp Check Discussion.

  • yes
  • no
0 voters
4 Likes
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I’m interested in this, in principle, but I’m against introducing a negative feedback loop.

I’d rather explore ways of incentivising participation rather than punishing lack thereof.

An idea that comes to mind is rewarding voters with MIN (following some rules, naturally) for participating, just like Catalyst does.

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giving them protocol rewards for not participating is incentivizing not participating. giving them their staking rewards for participating is incentivizing participation. or do you think im just referring to the min portion of the staking rewards? im referring to the whole thing. ill clarify

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My point was that this only affects a subset of MIN holders. For instance, how would you approach yield farmers?

Out of the total MIN in circulation to date, 1.369B tokens, 200M are in DAO reserves. This leaves us with 1.169B tokens, out of which:

484M tokens are staking in MIN Staking
292M tokens are LPing, of which 199 are Yield Farming.

If you punish MIN stakers for not participating in governance, what about yield farmers?

This is why I think a positive reinforcement is easier to implement than negative reinforcement.

2 Likes
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do yield farmers with pending rewards get those pending rewards counting toward their voting power? i dont think so. Regardless its a moot point since this proposal is only concerned with staking rewards for min holders staking min. i dont see the relevance of yield farmers and their pending rewards. Nor is it relevent for those holding min spot in wallet.

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I think you missed my point :frowning: .

I’m talking about the 199MIN held by yield farmers who continue earning rewards even if they don’t participate in governance.

Only punishing staked MIN would be an incomplete measure… But agreed, better than nothing.

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there is no incentivization for min votes that are not staked. the protocol is agnostic about them. we could conceivably increase incentivization so that only staked min counts for governance, but that would need a liquid option :wink:

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8

Well said seems to make sense. How do you separate people with money from people with talent? Classic question.

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@CWSchub also where did this discussion end up. Interested in engaging with you.

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Hi there!

Well unfortunately there wasn’t sufficient discussion for the proposal to enter the next phase.

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yes, what Schooby said, thanks schooby

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12

I think that this topic is valauble to continue the further discusstion🙂

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13

I agree. My opinion has shifted. $MIN is a governance token and should be used as such primarily. Especially now with the new governance portal, where the proposal author commits 10K $MIN tokens.

My take is that it’s harder to punish than it is to reward (define punishment duration and conditions, etc.). But I feel like this governance participation proposal ought to have a combination of both (punishment + reward).

The other complication is that punishment ought to be fair between stakers (can’t treat liquid the same as long term?).

1 Like